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Preventive Detention In California:
Can Some Criminal Defendants
Be Detained Prior To Trial?
In recent years there has been a growing concern with the need
to reform the procedures for releasing criminal defendants prior to
trial. Many states have changed their laws to emphasize release
of the defendant on his own recognizance rather than release when
the defendant posts bail. However, there is also a growing con-
cern over the release of "dangerous" defendants, i.e. those de-
fendants who might commit another crime if released prior to
trial. Assembly Bill 2834 was introduced in the 1971 Session of
the California Legislature, but the bill failed to pass. A.B. 2834
would have made substantial changes in California law. The bill
would have changed the law on pre-trial release of criminal de-
fendants to emphasize release on O.R. (own recognizance). In
addition A.B. 2834 would have allowed the arraigning magistrate
to detain certain classes of defendants prior to trial. This com-
ment briefly discusses the changes in pre-trial release as proposed
by the bill and then analyzes the preventive detention provisions of
the bill. The author attempts to determine which defendants, if
any, can rationally be detained as a means of preventing crime
committed during pre-trial release.
Criminal law dealing with pre-trial release and detention is in a state
of flux. Conflicting forces such as lengthy criminal court calendar
backlogs, overcrowded prisons, the general increase in crime (espe-
cially drug related crimes and civil disturbance), pressures to make
criminal justice applicable without regard to the wealth of the defend-
ant, and attempts to rehabilitate offenders rather than punish them,
are forcing re-evaluation and reform in pre-trial procedures. These re-
forms have generally been beneficial and are being implemented in
many jurisdictions.' Several states,' and the Federal System,8 have
changed their pre-trial release laws to a system emphasizing release
1. NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON BAIL AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 18, 19, 25-28 (1965)
[hereinafter cited as NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON BAnL].
2. Id. at 359-362.
3. The Federal Bail Reform Act of 1966, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3146-3150 (1966).
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on own recognizance (O.R.) and now require bail and other require-
ments for release only where the court feels such additional require-
ments are necessitated by good cause.
California is not in the forefront of reform in bail. California law
currently establishes bail as the primary mode of release for most ser-
ious offenses5 with release on O.R. available only where good cause
can be shown.' In the 1971 session of the legislature two bills were
introduced both of which would have reformed the entire system of
pre-trial release in California.7 Neither bill passed. This comment
considers only A.B. 2834 introduced by Assemblyman Townsend
which includes bail reforms similar to those in A.B. 2752 introduced
by Assemblyman Bagley, but goes a step beyond and proposes pre-
trial preventive detention.
A.B. 2834 would have changed the Penal Code relating to bail by
adding, amending, and deleting several sections." The bill was com-
prehensive in effect as it included provisions establishing release pol-
icy and requirements for all criminal defendants. It provided for spe-
cial criminal penalties for crime committed during release, and set up
the procedures and substantive standards for pre-trial preventive de-
tention with special standards for a state of emergency (riot).
Current Pre-Trial Release Law
Under California law now, all defendants are entitled to pre-trial
release on money bail as a matter of right except those defendants po-
tentially punishable by death.9 The judge is required by statute to con-
sider the crime charged, the likelihood of the defendant reappearing
for trial and the criminal record of the defendant in setting the amount
of bail.' 0 This portion of the law remains unchanged since its codifi-
cation in 187211 (except for the considerations to be made in estab-
lishing the amount of bail which were added in 1927).12 An alterna-
tive method of release (O.R., where good cause can be shown) was
added to the code in 1959.11 If defendant is not granted release on
4. The Federal act provides that the indigent are to be released on their own
recognizance unless good cause is otherwise shown for the denial of release. The stated
purpose of the act is "to assure that all persons regardless of their financial status, shall
not needlessly be detained pending their appearance to answer charges, to testify, or
pending appeal, when detention serves neither the ends of justice nor the public interest."
5. CAL. PEN. CODE § 1276.
6. CAL. PEN. CODE § 1318.
7. A.B. 2834, 1971 Regular Session. A.B. 2752, 1971 Regular Session.
8. A.B. 2834, 1971 Regular Session.
9. CAL. PEN. CODE § 1270.
10. CAL. PEN. CODE § 1275.
11. CAL. PEN. CODE § 1276.
12. CAL. PEN. CODE § 1275.
13. CAL. PEN. CODE § 1318.
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O.R. and is unable to post the bail set by the arraigning authority his
case must be reviewed within five days by the court, unless he waives
this right. 4 But attorneys frequently use the writ of habeas corpus as
a faster method for review of bail. 15
Once defendant is released and fails to appear when charged with a
felony,"6 he is subject to possible penalties of a $5000 fine and/or 5
years imprisonment.' 7  If charged with a misdemeanor, he is guilty of
a misdemeanor.' 8
Pre-Trial Release Law as Proposed by A.B. 2834
If A.B. 2834 had been enacted, release on O.R. rather than bail
would have been the primary mode of release.' 9 At arraignment a
defendant would have been eligible for release on O.R. unless the ar-
raigning authority decides he should not be released on O.R.2 ° In
that instance the defendant would still have been eligible for re-
lease under any one or combination of the following: 2' (1) re-
lease under supervision of a probation officer;22 (2) release with re-
strictions on travel, associations or abode;28 (3) release with bail or
deposit under now existing law;2" or (4) release under any other con-
ditions deemed necessary.25
To have been released on O.R. a defendant must have promised (1)
to appear when and where specified, (2) to waive extradition if he
fails to appear and is apprehended outside the state, and (3) to com-
mit no crime while on release.26 At this time the judge would have
had to inform the defendant of harsh penalties established for any vi-
olation of conditions and terms of release. Any defendant on any
14. CAL. PEN. CODE § 1320.
15. CAL. PEN. CODE § 1473.
16. CAL. PEN. CODE § 1319.4.
17. Id.
18. CAL. PEN. CODE § 1319.6.
19. A.B. 2834, 1971 Regular Session. Proposed addition, § 1267, to the Penal
Code.
20. A.B. 2834, 1971 Regular Session. Proposed addition, § 1267.1, to the Penal
Code.
21. Id.
22. A.B. 2834, 1971 Regular Session. Proposed addition, § 1267.1(a), to the
Penal Code.
23. A.B. 2834, 1971 Regular Session. Proposed addition, § 1267.1(b), to the
Penal Code.
24. A.B. 2834, 1971 Regular Session. Proposed addition, § 1267.1(c), to the
Penal Code.
25. A.B. 2834, 1971 Regular Session. Proposed addition, § 1267.1(d), to the
Penal Code.
26. A.B. 2834, 1971 Regular Session. Proposed addition, § 1267(a)-(c), to the
Penal Code.
27. A.B. 2834, 1971 Regular Session. Proposed addition, § 1267.3, to the
Penal Cde.
1972 / Preventive Detention in California
form of release who commits a crime while on release or violates a
condition of release would have been guilty of a felony or misdemeanor
depending on whether the original crime charged was, respectively, a
felony or misdemeanor.28 The felony carried up to a five year sentence,
to run consecutively with any sentence for the original charge.2" The
misdemeanor carried a mandatory 30 day to six month consecutive sen-
tence.30 In addition conviction of a felony committed while on re-
lease must have resulted in a consecutive sentence with no possibility
of probation or a suspended sentence for that crime."
The bill set out a list of factors which should have been consid-
ered in arriving at a decision on the form of release for each defend-
ant.32 If the defendant could not meet the requirements set for his re-
lease within 24 hours, he could have requested his case be reviewed. 3
If the authority at this review (within 24 hours of the request) did not
change the release requirements to allow defendant's release, a written
opinion must have been prepared giving the reasons for the release re-
quirements imposed.34  Presumably any such opinion would be based
on the factors specified in the bill as those which the court should con-
sider.
Pre-trial Preventive Detention Under A.B. 2834
The judge or magistrate would have had another alternative avail-
able where pre-trial release of a defendant appeared inadvisable. He
may have ordered the defendant held without bail under the pre-trial
preventive detention portion of this bill.3" A.B. 2834 would have al-
lowed pre-trial preventive detention only when it is determined at
a summary hearing, held at arraignment, that no form of release will
assure the reappearance of the defendant, the safety of the community,
28. A.B. 2834, 1971 Regular Session. Proposed amendment, § 1319.4 and
1319.6, to the Penal Code.
29. A.B. 2834, 1971 Regular Session. Proposed amendment, § 1319.4, to the
Penal Code.
30. A.B. 2834, 1971 Regular Session. Proposed amendment, § 1319.6, to the
Penal Code.
31. A.B. 2834, 1971 Regular Session. Proposed amendment, § 1319.7, to the
Penal Code.
32. A.B. 2834, 1971 Regular Session. Proposed addition to the Penal Code
§ 1267.2
. . . mhe nature and circumstances of the offense charged, the safety of
any other person or the community, the weight of the evidence against the
defendant, his family ties, employment, financial resources, character and
mental condition, past conduct, length of residence in the community, and
record of attendance at prior court proceedings.
33. A.B. 2834, 1971 Regular Session. Proposed addition, § 1267.4, to the Penal
Code.
34. Id.
35. A.B. 2834, 1971 Regular Session. Proposed addition, § 1267.6, to the Penal
Code.
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or the unobstructed administration of justice.3 6 To have allowed
pre-trial detention it must have been shown by clear and convincing
evidence there was (1) a substantial probability defendant is guilty of
the offense charged3 7 and (2) there must be reasonable cause to be-
lieve one of the following: (1) (the catch-all) that no form of re-
lease will reasonably assure the appearance of the defendant, the
safety of the community or the unobstructed administration of jus-
tice;38 or (2) that defendant is a drug addict;"0 or (3) that defend-
ant is making his living by illegally selling drugs.40  If these ele-
ments were found, defendant could have been detained.
If the prosecution decided to press for detention of a defendant, it
would have made an oral motion at the arraignment.41 At that time,
unless defendant requested a continuance (two days at most), a sum-
mary hearing must have been held. 42  Defendant had a right to coun-
sel, to be present, to testify, and cross-examine witnesses. 43  The bur-
den of proof would have been on the prosecution to show by clear and
convincing evidence the need for detention." The rules of evidence
would have applied but all testimony would have been inadmissable
in any later trial, except at a trial for perjury.45 The detention must have
ended within 30 days or at the time trial began unless defendant
made a motion for delay of the trial.46
Summary of Changes Which A.B. 2834 Would Have Made
Obviously the law would have been changed in several aspects by
A.B. 2834. O.R. rather than bail would be the first considered mode
of release.4 7  Restricted releases or supervised release without bail
would be permissible in addition to the present release on bail; 48 the
36. Id.
37. A.B. 2834, 1971 Regular Session. Proposed addition, § 1267.7(d), to the
Penal Code.
38. A.B. 2834, 1971 Regular Session. Proposed addition, § 1267.7(a), to the
Penal Code.
39. A.B. 2834, 1971 Regular Session. Proposed addition, § 1267.7(b), to the
Penal Code.
40. A.B. 2834, 1971 Regular Session. Proposed addition, § 1267.7(c), to the
Penal Code.
41. A.B. 2834, 1971 Regular Session. Proposed addition, § 1267.8(b), to the
Penal Code.
42. Id.
43. A.B. 2834, 1971 Regular Session. Proposed addition, § 1267.8(d), to the
Penal Code.
44. A.B. 2834, 1971 Regular Session. Proposed addition, § 1267.8(e), to the
Penal Code.
45. Id.
46. A.B. 2834, 1971 Regular Session. Proposed addition, § 1267.9, to the Penal
Code.
47. See note 19 supra.
48. See note 21 supra.
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law would be harsh for violation of conditions and the defendant
would be aware of that.4 9 Review on a speedy basis would be avail-
able without the need to resort to the writ of habeas corpus. ° Failure
of the court to set standards allowing release would require the court
to give a written explanation for such failure." This requirement
of a written decision stating the reasons for not releasing defendant
would have simplified appellate review of bail. Presently, the appellate
court bases its review of bail on a memorandum written by the arraign-
ing magistrate upon the request of the appellate court.52 It also might
have pressured the court to allow pre-trial release more often.
A.B. 2834 would not have allowed pre-trial release where it is cur-
rently prohibited but it would have been a meaningful, though subtle,
change to emphasize pre-trial release in some way and form. The em-
phasis on release based upon the character and background of the de-
fendant rather than his ability to raise bail would result in the poor
man having a better chance to receive the type of pre-trial treatment
once available to only the rich.53
Allowing pre-trial release is important. Defendants released prior
to trial are able to maintain jobs and important family relationships. 4
These defendants are also in a much better position to prepare their
defense. On release they are able to locate vital witnesses and have
unimpeded preparation with their counsel.5 5 These advantages are
significant. Several studies have shown there is significantly less
likelihood that a defendant released prior to trial will be convicted, and
if convicted, the sentence will be lighter, or he will be much more likely
to get probation in lieu of jail than the defendant who is detained
prior to trial.6 Another important consideration is the possibility
of holding an innocent man prior to trial; pre-trial release also avoids
the very real problem of intermingling innocent defendants with
hardened convicts in overcrowded jails.17 A defendant detained prior
to trial would lose these advantages of pre-trial release.
49. See note 27 supra.
50. See note 34 supra.
51. Id.
52. Fernandez v. United States 81 S. Ct. 642, 644 (1961); CAL. RULES OF COURT,
Rule 60.
53. U.S. A'rr' GEN. CoMm. REP., POVERTY AND THE ADmNiSTRATION OF CRMH-
NAL JUsTIcE 66, 67 (1963); McCarthy, Jr. The District of Columbia Bail Project,
53 GEo. LJ. 675, 684 (1965); NATONAL CONFERENCE ON BAiL, at 48; BAn. AND SUM-
MONS: 1965, 22 (1966).
54. LaFave, Alternatives to the Present Bail System, 1965 U. ILL. L. FORUM,
8, 11 (1965); ABA Project PRmsT.rRELEASE, 23-25 (Tent. Draft 1968).
55. Id.
56. Foote, Compelling Appearance in Court: Administration of Bail in Philadel-
phia, 102 U. PA. L. REv. 1031, 1054 (1954); R. GOLDFARB, RANSOM 221 (1964);
McCarthy, Jr., supra note 53, at 688-702.
57. NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON BAIL, at 193.
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Preventive Detention: Pro and Con
A plan for pre-trial preventive detention has been enacted in only
one jurisdiction to this date-Washington D.C."0 Because the concept
is relatively untested, the practical and legal merits of the concept are
strongly debated by proponents and opponents.
Proponents of preventive detention argue that increased appellate
scrutiny of bail orders hinders the current ability of judges to detain
dangerous defendants by imposing high bail." It is also pointed out
that preventive detention will not significantly increase the number of
defendants detained prior to trial because of the current procedure of
setting high bail. In one study it was shown that only about 1 out of
5 defendants was able to post bail and be released when bail is set
at $5000 or more. 0 The increase in crime generally, and specifi-
cally crime committed by those released prior to trial, is pointed
to as proof of the need for preventive detention of dangerous defend-
ants. 61
Opponents of preventive detention argue that preventive detention
creates more problems than it solves. It will detain many who would
not have committed a crime while on pre-trial release."2 It will in-
crease jail administrative costs by holding more persons and neces-
sitating more hearings and judicial proceedings.03 They also argue
that, in fact, very little crime is committed by persons on bail that could
not be prevented by having trials within sixty days of the arrest.0"4
They argue that the human cost of detaining defendants by disrupting
home life or work is too great for the dubious benefits gained. 0 Lastly,
it is argued preventive detention is not permissible under the constitu-
tion.60
THE CONSTITUTION AND PREVENTIVE DETENTION UNDER A.B. 2834
Pre-trial preventive detention in general is susceptible to attack
58. District of Columbia Court Reform and Ciriminal Procedure Act of 1970,
Pub. L. No. 91-358, § 23-1322 et seq., 84 Stat. 473 [hereinafter cited as REFORM ACT
OF 1970].
59. NATIONAL COMFERENCE ON BAIL, at 203-206.
60. McCarthy, Jr., supra note 53 at 684.
61. PRESmENT'S COMM'N, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS, 39 (1967); NA-
TIONAL CONFERENCE ON BAmIL, at 180.
62. Preventive Detention; An Empirical Analysis, 6 HARV. Civ. RioHTs-CIV. LiB.
L. REv. 303, 325 (1971).
63. See Comment, supra note 62 at 355; PRESIDENT'S COMM'N, supra note 61,
at 41.
64. Ervin, Jr., Foreword: Preventive Detention-A Step Backward for Criminal
Justice, 6 HARV. Civ. RIGHTs-CIv. LIB. L. REV. 289, 298 (1971).
65. U.S. ATr'Y GEN. COMM. REP., supra note 53, at 71.
66. Foote, The Coming Constitutional Crisis in Bail: I & 11, 113 U. PA. L. REv.
959 & 1180 (1965).
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based on two constitutional provisions. First, it can be argued that it
violates the eighth amendment prohibition of excessive bail. Second, it
can be argued it violates the fourteenth amendment by taking liberty
without due process of law or denying the guarantee of equal pro-
tection.
Certain defendants who had not committed capital crimes would have
been held with no right to bail under the preventive detention section of
A.B. 2834. If the eighth amendment of the United States Constitution
confers an absolute right to bail in all non-capital offenses the preven-
tive detention portion of A.B. 2834 would obviously be unconstitutional.
But there is a dispute as to whether or not the eighth amendment to the
United States Constitution guarantees a right to bail or only a right to
reasonable bail when bail is provided for by law.
In Carlson v. Landon 7 and Stack v. Boyle6 the United States Su-
preme Court considered the eighth amendment's prohibition of exces-
sive bail. In Carlson v. Landon69 the U.S. Supreme Court in a 5-4 deci-
sion found that the right to bail did not attach to all arrests, at least not to
an arrest of aliens being deported under the Internal Security Act of 1950
which did not provide for bail. 70  The distinction was made by the
Court between criminal arrests that were bailable and non-criminal ar-
rests, such as these pre-deportation hearing arrests that were non-bailable
by statute. 71
Stack v. Boyle72 involved defendants who were arrested for conspir-
ing to violate the Smith Act. Bail was set at $50,000 because four per-
sons convicted for the same offense in another jurisdiction had forfeited
bail.73 The U.S. Supreme Court found there was a right to bail and fur-
ther there was a right to reasonable bail, reasonable bail being only the
amount necessary to assure the re-appearance of the individual defendant
to stand trial.7 4 The ruling was not based upon the eighth amendment
but upon a federal statute.75 There was dicta describing the right to
bail as a traditional right, a right necessary to allow a defendant to pre-
pare his case and to avoid punishment prior to trial, and that without
these rights the presumption of innocence has no meaning. 6
Because these cases do not really settle the issue, scholars have con-
67. 342 U.S. 524 (1952).
68. 342 U.S. 1 (1951).
69. 342 U.S. 524 (1952).
70. 342 U.S. 524, 526 (1952).
71. Id. at 537.
72. 342 U.S. 1 (1951).
73. 342 U.S. 1, 2 (1951).
74. Id. at 4.
75. Id.
76. Id.
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tinued to debate the meaning of the eighth amendment. Professor Ca-
leb Foote has presented a strong argument for the eighth amendment im-
plicity guaranteeing a right to bail in all non-capital cases.77 He traced
the history of bail in the English system since the Magna Carta and
showed how, by the time of the adoption of the constitution in 1791,
English courts had no discretion, but had to set bail in non-capital of-
fenses.78 He argues that this was a common law right which the drafters
of the Constitution intended to protect by the inclusion of the right to a
writ of habeas corpus in the Constitution which was, and is, the means
to enforce the right to bail. 9 Also the right was further defined and
strengthened by the eighth amendment requirement that bail not be
excessive."' He then dismissed Carlson v. Landon81 as being based on
the faulty assumption that bail was discretionary with English Courts.82
Professor Foote then applied an equal protection and due process ra-
tionale, as exemplified by Griffin v. Illinois,83 to interpret and expand
the meaning of the word "excessive" in the eighth amendment.8 4 He
concluded that any bail set in money is excessive for an indigent person.8
That is, pre-trial release must be based on some rationale or criteria other
than financial ability.
In an address to the National Conference on Bail and Criminal Jus-
tice, then Chief Justice Warren, in discussing the Judiciary Act of 1789
and the eighth amendment, apparently agreed with Professor Foote by
saying that eighth amendment rights have "generally been construed as
guaranteeing the right to bail by logical implication." 86
But there is a logical argument which contradicts the Foote and War-
ren viewpoint. Attorney General Mitchell has presented a logical analy-
sis in support of the argument that the eight amendment only guarantees
that bail, when provided by law, not be excessive.8 7 The law of 1789
made a great many more crimes punishable by death than does the law
today.8 8 It is argued that the guarantee of reasonable bail is applicable
only to such crimes as were bailable-that were not punishable by death
-in 1789.8" Most modem felonies would therefore not be bailable. A
77. Foote, supra note 66, at 965.
78. Id. at 973.
79. Id. at 968.
80. Id. at 968.
81. 342 U.S. 524 (1952).
82. Foote, supra note 66, at 978.
83. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
84. Foote, supra note 66, at 1164.
85. Id. at 1153.
86. NATIONAL COMFERENCE ON BAIL, at 7.
87. Mitchell, Bail Reform and the Constitutionality of Pretrial Detention, 55 VA.
L REv. 1223 (1969).
88. Id. at 1227.
89. Id. at 1230.
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torney General Mitchell argues further that as capital punishment can be
either enlarged or restricted by Congress and by the various state legisla-
tures, so also should the right to bail be susceptible either to enlargement
or restriction by legislation. 90
Until the Supreme Court settles these arguments, we cannot be sure
what the eighth amendment guarantees or precludes. Pre-trial preventive
detention would clearly be unconstitutional if the Court construes the
eighth amendment to implicitly guarantee a right to bail in all non-capital
cases.
Preventive Detention and the Fourteenth Amendment
If the court does not construe the eighth amendment to guarantee this
right to bail, detention under A.B. 2834 would have to meet the due
process and equal protection provisions of the fourteenth amendment. 91
A decision on the constitutionality of pre-trial detention which is based
on the fourteenth amendment would allow the Court to avoid the enunci-
ation of a new constitutionally guaranteed right to bail in all non-capital
offenses. Therefore it seems that the eighth amendment becomes less im-
portant in considering the drafting, implementation and interpretation of
A.B. 2834 while problems involving the fourteenth amendment become
more important.
Procedural Due Process and A.B. 2834
A statute providing for pre-trial detention must meet the requisites of
substantive and procedural due process. A body of case law sets out
these requisites. Under these cases, the procedural due process require-
ments of the fourteenth amendment would have probably been satisfied
by the provisions of A.B. 2834. But there were some questionable as-
pects of the bill. There are no decisions to date which establish the pro-
cedural requirements for a detention proceeding, but there are decisions
with which detention proceedings can be compared.
A proceeding that is analogous to detention hearings is civil commit-
ment.92 In California there are strict statutory procedural requirements
for civil commitment. 93  Commitment for those with mental disorders
and for those addicted to drugs is by summary hearing. 4 Any appeal is
90. Id.
91. The pertinent portion of the fourteenth amendment is "nor shall any state
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV.
92. See George, Due Process in Protective Activities, 8 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 133
(1968).
93. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 3100 et seq. 5303.
94. Id.
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made by writ of habeas corpus.9 At the appeal hearing there is a right
to retain counsel, a right to counsel for indigents, a right to present and
cross-examine witnesses, a right to adequate and timely notice and even
a right to a jury to consider limited questions of fact. 96 The United States
Supreme Court found all these procedural rights, with the exception of a
jury, to be necessary to commit a defendant as a sexual psychopath.17
The court characterized the process as criminal in nature and on that
basis concluded that all these rights are essential to satisfy the constitu-
tional right to due process of law."'
The right to a jury is absent from A.B. 2834 because of the summary
nature of the remedy.99 Another right which, arguably, is missing is the
right to adequate and timely notice. The United States Supreme Court
has been strict in requiring timely notice to defendants of the charges
against them. Lack of adequate notice was the basis for reversal in Gold-
berg v. Kelly'00 which involved the arbitrary denial of welfare aid. The
Court held that timely and adequate notice of the hearing which speci-
fied the reasons for termination of the aid was essential to due process.10'
Specifying the exact reasons for detention -under A.B. 2834 would
have been difficult because of the very general grounds for detention,10 2
but with a well drafted statute it would be possible to give adequate notice
by clearly specifying the grounds for detention.
The requirement of timely notice poses additional problems. A deten-
tion hearing at arraignment, 0 3 within 72 hours of arrest, is short notice
for the purpose of developing any defense. The obvious solution would
be to allow the postponement of the hearing on a motion by defendant.
But during this period defendant must remain in jail, otherwise there
would be no purpose for a "detention" hearing. In the Washington D.C.
preventive detention measure a continuance up to five days is allowed on
motion from the defense.'1 4  The prosecution, on a showing of good
cause, can request a three day continuance.' 05 The defendant is held
without bail during a continuance requested by either side.' 0 6 A.B.
2834 did not specify whether defendant could be held without bail dur-
95. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 5275. '
96. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§ 3104, 3108, 5302, 5303.
97. Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967).
98. Id. at 610.
99. Duncan v. Louisianna, 391 U.S. 145, 161 (1968). The holding indicates a po-
tential jeopardy of at least six months imprisonment must be involved before the right
to a jury trial attaches.
100. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
101. Id. at 267.
102. See text accompanying notes 129-131 infra.
103. CAL. PEN. CODE § 859.
104. RmEom AcT oF 1970, at §§ 23-1322(c) (3), 23-1322(4).
105. Id.
106. Id.
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ing any continuance.117 It did limit the continuance to a maximum of
two days on request by defendant, and no continuance was allowed the
prosecution in any case.'08 But the time interval provided for in A.B.
2834 is arguably inadequate for preparing a defense. There is clearly
a conflict between the need for a prompt hearing and the need for ade-
quate time to prepare for the hearing. However, since the defendant is
being detained until there is a hearing, the need for a prompt hearing
probably outweighs the need for time to prepare a defense.
Another procedural problem arises when one considers whether the
rules of evidence should be applicable and whether any of the hearing
records should be admissible at trial. There are no United States Su-
preme Court cases deeming the rules of evidence to be essential to a
hearing, administrative proceeding, or juvenile proceeding, but there is
dicta indicating that application of the rules of evidence is essential for
due process in juvenile hearings. 1' 9
In the Washington D.C. preventive detention law, the rules of evidence
are not applicable at a detention hearing. The proceedings are not ad-
missible at a subsequent trial, except for impeachment purposes. 10
Even with this limitation it seems questionable to allow hearsay and
other forms of usually unacceptable evidence to be the basis for de-
tention; especially as this evidence is (1) admissible, by statute, un-
der the guise of impeachment and is (2) used for the determination
of probable guilt at the hearing. Under A.B. 2834 the rules of evi-
dence would have been applicable and the proceedings inadmissible
at any later trial except at a trial for perjury.:" But the flat restriction of
all or any portion of the detention proceedings from consideration at trial
hinders as well as protects the defendant. The defendant could be given
the option of presenting portions of the detention hearing record at trial
upon a showing of good cause as presently allowed in other proceedings
by statute." 2 Good cause might be found where an important defense
witness was heard and cross-examined at the detention hearing but is not
available for the trial.
THE SUBSTANTIVE PROVISIONS OF A.B. 2834
In contrast to the high procedural standards, A.B. 2834 did not have
107. A.B. 2834, 1971 Regular Session. Proposed addition, § 1267.8(a), to the
Penal Code.
108. A.B. 2834, 1971 Regular Session. Proposed addition, § 1267.8(b), to the
Penal Code.
109. In re Winship 397 U.S. 358, 362 (1970).
110. REFoami AcT of 1970 at § 23-1322(c) (6).
111. A.B. 2834, 1971 Regular Session. Proposed addition, § 1267.8(e), to the
Penal Code.
112. CAL. Evm. CODE § 1291.
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clear and objective substantive provisions to guide the arraigning au-
thority in ordering detention. In analyzing the specific elements required
for detention it must be remembered the courts have applied very strict
standards to laws infringing or likely to infringe on fundamental rights."83
Under the equal protection clause the state has the burden of demonstrat-
ing a compelling state interest when statutory classification infringes on a
person's fundamental rights." 4
Because the incarceration of a person, before an adjudication of guilt,
infringes on his fundamental right to liberty the courts will require the
state to demonstrate a compelling interest when detaining a specified class
of individuals prior to trial." 5
The elements which must have been established under A.B. 2834 to
detain a defendant were (1) a substantial probability that he was guilty of
the crime charged" 6 and (2) he fell into one of the following categor-
ies: (a) he was a person for whom no conditions of release would guar-
antee his appearance, the safety of the community, or the unobstructed
administration of justice" 7 or, (b) he was a drug addict" 8 or, (c) he made
his living from the illegal sale of drugs." 9 If detention is sought during
an official state of extreme emergency, the prosecution would have had
to show only that release of the defendant would have been likely to con-
tribute to the circumstances which led to the state of emergency. 20
Probable Guilt as an Essential Element for Detention
Even though a defendant is a member of one of the classes listed in the
proposed statute, there must still be a showing, to a substantial proba-
bility, that defendant is guilty.' 2 ' Although this is a lesser degree of
proof than that which is necessary to convict the defendant (beyond a
reasonable doubt) 22 there may still be a due process issue raised when a
likelihood of guilt is an essential element for detention.
The United States Supreme Court recently held that under the due
process clause, where determination of guilt at a civil juvenile hearing re-
sulted in detention, the required degree of proof must be proof beyond a
113. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942); Korematsu v. United States,
323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944); Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524 (1960); Sherbert v.
Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969);
Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. See note 37 supra.
117. See note 38 supra.
118. See note 39 supra.
119. See note 40 supra.
120. A.B. 2834, 1971 Regular Session. Proposed addition, § 1267.11(b), to the
Penal Code.
121. See note 37 supra.
122. CAL. PEN. CODE § 1096.
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reasonable doubt, and not the civil standard of proof-a preponderance
of the evidence. 1 3 The court reasoned that any incarceration is the same
deprivation of liberty of the defendant no matter what it is called or why
it is imposed.' 24 Confinement and the public stigma resulting from juve-
nile detention were held similar enough to a criminal conviction to re-
quire criminal standards of proof.12  If the Supreme Court characterizes
a juvenile detention hearing as one requiring a criminal standard of proof,
it should follow that a preventive detention hearing requires a criminal
standard of proof. If this is so, requiring proof of "guilt" as an essential
element for detention would force the court to conduct a pre-trial trial.
The need to preserve the presumption of innocence is another reason
for not utilizing "guilt" as an element in determining whether a defendant
should be detained. The Supreme Court, in Stack v. Boyle,' 2 was con-
cerned about this loss of the presumption of innocence and the court felt
release on reasonable bail was necessary to preserve the practical effect of
this presumption.'2 Therefore, if the jury learned or even suspected
that defendant was detained and also knew probable guilt was essential
to that detention, it could be argued defendant was denied due process
since he was thereby deprived of a presumption of innocence.
Finally, it is possible to argue that guilt is not necessarily relevant in
determining which defendants should be detained prior to trial. Pre-trial
detention is supposedly based on a compelling need to protect the com-
munity from further criminal behavior. 2 8 The rationale is prevention
of crime not punishment for crime. Whether or not defendant is guilty is
only relevant if "guilt" makes it more likely he will commit crime while
released pending trial. If defendant's probability of guilt is used in de-
ciding this issue, the determination of guilt is only useful in two fact situ-
ations; (1) where a record of recidivism is the basis for belief defendant
will commit a crime if released, or (2) as a defense for the innocent de-
fendant.
Consider how guilt or lack thereof would be applied to a defendant
who has a history of crime. An example might be a defendant charged
with burglary and theft. This defendant would have a right to some form
of pre-trial release unless it could be shown that he would be likely to
commit more crimes while on pre-trial release. A pattern of such behav-
ior in the past, (a record showing repeated crimes) plus a strong showing
123. In re Winship 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
124. Id. at 366.
125. Id. at 367.
126. 342 U.S. 1 (1951).
127. Id. at 4.
128. Hearings on Pre-Trial Detention, Before the California Senate Subcommittee
on Judiciary, Sept. 15, 1970, p. 118 [hereinafter cited as Hearings].
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that he had just commited one or more such crimes would make it more
plausible to believe he might well commit another crime if released. In
this perspective, the showing of guilt would be used not as an element for
detention but rather as evidence establishing a pattern of criminal be-
havior.
Another example of a time when guilt may be relevant is when the de-
fendant is innocent of the crime charged, but he has a criminal record.
He may have little or no community ties and the prosecution is relying on
past record in seeking pre-trial detention. This defendant may very
well welcome the early opportunity to assert his defenses and require the
prosecution to establish a substantial probability of his guilt. These inno-
cent defendants could be protected by requiring the proof of guilt only be
made by the prosecution where the defendant chooses to assert his inno-
cence as a defense to detention. Proof of guilt therefore, except as evi-
dence of recidivism, would only be necessary where innocence was as-
serted as a defense to detention. Guilt would not be a necessary element
for detention in any other case. Without formal adjudication of guilt
there would be less likelihood of prejudice to the detained defendant and
the detention would more clearly be preventive detention, rather than
incarceration for a crime of which the defendant is still presumably
innocent.
Defendants for Whom no Form of Release is Satisfactory-a Basis for
Detention
After a finding of probable guilt, A.B. 2834 provided that defendant
must fit into one of the three categories discussed above 129 before he
could be detained. The first alternative category is the one that provides
for detention of defendants for whom no form of release would be satis-
factory. The language of this subdivision may have been sufficiently
clear and specific so that the test of a "compelling state interest" for de-
taining this class of defendants would be satisfied. The subdivision pro-
vided that these defendants could have been detained only when no con-
ditions of release would "assure the appearance of the defendant, the
safety of any person or the community, or the unobstructed administra-
tion of justice."' 130 The section provided that a defendant could be de-
tained only if the magistrate finds "reasonable cause to believe" defend-
ant fits this category of defendants (or one of the other categories).
This section may have been subject to abuse because there were no
standards to guide the magistrate in finding "reasonable cause" to believe
129. See text accompanying note 38 supra.
130. A.B. 2834, 1971 Regular Session. Proposed Addition, § 1267.7(a).
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defendant would fail to appear, or threaten the safety of the community
or obstruct justice. There was nothing in the bill to prevent an individ-
ual magistrate from finding reasonable cause to believe the defendant is
a threat to the safety of the community just because he is charged with a
crime. 131
Drug Addiction As A Basis for Detention
The second category of defendants liable for detention under A.B.
2834-those defendants who were drug addicts- - -- 32 is detention for the
wrong reason. Drug addiction is a basis for committing an addict to
treatment for his personal well-being, but is an addict (not a seller of
drugs) such a danger to the community his release cannot be permitted?
The drafters of A.B. 2834 seem to have overlooked the fact that the law
already provides for detention or commitment of drug addicts and par-
ticular procedures are specified for addicts accused of a crime. 3 3 Ap-
parently the drafters of A.B. 2834 presumed that drug addicts are a
danger to the community.
In an empirical study of crime committed on bail there was no evi-
dence that narcotics addicts are significantly more likely to commit crime
during release than other defendants. 33 Given this fact there appears to
be no reason for "singling out" addicts for pre-trial detention unless the
detention is for treatment. In the Washington, D.C. preventive detention
law a separate provision applies to those who are found to be drug addicts
after a medical examination. The court may order the defendant de-
tained prior to trial, or order detention with medical care prior to trial, or
civilly commit the defendant/addict for treatment.'
3 5
In addition, detention without treatment arguably imposes cruel and
unusual punishment upon these defendants. In Robinson v. California3 6
the United States Supreme Court struck down a California statute which
made narcotics addiction a misdemeanor with a mandatory 90 day jail
sentence. The court held that the statute in effect made the "status" of
narcotics addiction a criminal offense and that jailing a defendant for this
"status" rather than for a criminal act constituted cruel and unusual pun-
ishment and therefore the statute was void.' 37  The detention provided
131. This could be considered a violation of substantive due process. See Justice
Black's dissent in In re Winship 397 U.S. 358, 377 (1970).
132. A.B. 2834, 1971 Regular Session. Proposed addition, § 1267.7(b), to the
Penal Code. That the defendant is addicted to narcotics, or because of repeated use of
narcotics, is in imminent danger of becoming addicted to the use of narcotics;. ...
133. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 3100.
134. See Comment, supra note 62, at 311.
135. REroRM Act OF 1970, at § 23-1323.
136. 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
137. Id. at 667.
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for addicts in A.B. 2834 differs in that the defendant would have been
charged with a crime besides addiction, but it can be argued that the de-
fendant-addict is being denied the fundamental right to bail and liberty
solely for his status as an addict; the non-addict defendants charged with
the same crime would have a right to pre-trial release, while the addict
would not.
Illegal Drug Selling-As A Basis for Detention
The third alternative-that defendant is an illegal drug seller' 3 8-may
be sufficient for a showing of compelling state interest in detention. Il-
legal drug marketing is a serious problem which often continues during
pre-trial release. Preventive detention would stop this abuse of pre-trial
release. At the street retail level drug peddlers are often selling to
support their own habit. If they are arrested for narcotics possssion
and sale, and then released on bail they then have, with an upcoming
trial and bond expenses, an even greater incentive to sell drugs. But
it is argued if the defendant is a dealer and an addict there is no need
for preventive pre-trial detention as he may be detained or committed
under existing law for treatment for drug addiction. 30
Non-addict criminals in organized illegal drug distribution with large
amounts of capital at their disposal are the major abusers of bail. 140
These defendants often threaten witnesses and continue sales and distri-
bution when released prior to trial; many also forfeit bail. Large amounts
of bail are ineffective in holding these defendants or guaranteeing their
appearance for trial because of the substantial profits involved and the
large amounts of capital available, as a consequence, for bail and bail for-
feiture expense. 141  In the South District of New York, from 1960
through 1969, $530,000 of an approximate total of $632,000 of bail
forfeitures were forfeited by defendants in major narcotics cases. 142
Secondly, law enforcement officials believe detention would aid in the
control of illegal drug trafficking because of the problems of investigating
and controlling defendants who are free on bail.143  These officials ar-
gue that because of the exclusionary rules relating to evidence wrongfully
obtained by police it is more difficult to investigate and prosecute for
criminal activity carried on during pre-trial release than it is prior to the
138. A.B. 2834, 1971 Regular Session. Proposed addition, § 1267.7(c), to the
Penal Code . .. [Tihat sale of narcotics provides him with a substantial part of his
livelihood; ....
139. See text accompanying note 133 supra.
140. H.R. REP. No. 91-1808, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 64 (1971).
141. Hearings on Crime In America Before a Select Comm. of the House on
Crime, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 53-55 (1970).
142. See note 140 supra, at 64.
143. Id. at 69.
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initial arrest. 4 The case of Massiah v. United States4 5 is an example.
Massiah was arrested for narcotics trafficking and released on bail.
While Massiah was on bail, police "bugged" the car of one of Massial's
confederates with the confederate's permission. Massiah made damaging
admissions while in the car talking with the confederate. 146 This evi-
dence would have been admissible if obtained prior to arrest, but was
inadmissible in this situation because it violated Massiah's sixth amend-
ment rights to have counsel before any questioning after arrest.147
But the only police function restricted by Massiah was the gathering of
evidence after arrest and during pre-trial release. If need be, surveillance
and control can be better maintained by release with conditions which is
less drastic than preventive detention. 14 8
Because of the serious personal and societal injury resulting from ille-
gal drugs and because pre-trial release may increase the distribution of
illegal drugs, pre-trial preventive detention is considered by some law en-
forcement authorities to be necessary to effectively control organized ille-
gal drug trafficking. Based on these policy considerations, there may be
a compelling state interest in detaining these defendants and measures
drafted clearly and narrowly to be applicable only to non-addict defend-
ants charged with crimes involving drug trafficking may be constitu-
tionally acceptable. But these particular defendants are few in number
and enacting preventive detention to combat these criminals, when there
are other steps available, would seem unwise.
Detention During a Riot
A.B. 2834 also included separate provisions and different criteria for
riots. 49 If a state of emergency had been proclaimed by the governor,
as provided for by law,'5 0 a defendant might have been detained if it was
found he was "likely to contribute to the circumstances which led to the
proclamation."' Again, this is a broad, general, category that could be
applied to many people without regard for the type of crime they are
charged with or the type or degree of danger to the community if the
defendants were released. Besides the possible lack of compelling state
144. Id. at 69.
145. 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
146. Id. at 203.
147. Id. at 206; PRESIDENT's COMM'N, TASK FORCE REPORT: ORGANIZED CRIME,
98 (1967).
148. Hearings, at 102.
149. A.B. 2834, 1971 Regular Session. Proposed addition, § 1267.11, to the
Penal Code.
150. CAL. MIL. & VET. CODE § 1580.
151. A.B. 2834, 1971 Regular Session. Proposed addition, § 1267.11, to the Penal
Code.
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interest, there is the danger of infringing on first amendment freedoms
when detention is applied to mass disturbances.
A riot should be clearly differentiated from a mass demonstration
where the exercise of first amendment freedoms are primary and property
damage is only incidental. First amendment rights can, in general, be
limited only where their exercise poses a clear and present danger.', 2
Therefore, when providing for preventive detention in riot situations the
law must not restrict first amendment freedoms; it must be phrased so that
it clearly applies to riots only.
Under A.B. 2834 preventive detention of a defendant because he is
likely to return to the foray if released would have been possible only af-
ter the Governor declared a state of extreme emergency as prescribed
by law.' 53 Threfore, unless this power was abused by the Governor, de-
fendants would not have been detained under the provision unless there
was some clear and present danger. Hence, it could be argued first
amendment rights may not have been violated under the provisions of
A.B. 2834.
Pre-trial preventive detention is felt to be necessary by some authori-
ties to deal with riots because riots can become extremely dangerous al-
most instantly and are only stopped by time and/or the strongest of police
measures. The situation often becomes a serious threat to property, life,
and government which may justify strong measures. One of the ways, it
is argued, that riots may be quelled is by detaining those arrested during
the rioting until the disturbance is over.154  Law enforcement officials
feel it is extremely important to keep participants from rejoining the hu-
man conflagration when released. They believe mass disturbances such
as experienced in Watts, Detroit, Newark, Washington, D.C., Chicago
and other major cities, are more difficult to subdue with the return of
"bailed out" rioters who may be more vehement than when originally ar-
rested.' -5 The situation has been described as a "rotating door" which
must be stopped by preventive detention.'5 6
Currently this rotating door is stopped by sub rosa detention in the
form of high bails and belated arraignments.' 57 During the Watts riot,
which lasted several days, over 2,200 persons were arrested in connection
152. Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315, 321 (1951); Cox v. Louisiana No. 49, 379
U.S. 559, 563 (1965).
153. A.B. 2834, 1971 Regular Session. Proposed addition, § 1267.11, to the Penal
Code.
154. Hearings, at 87.
155. Id.; Comment, Criminal Justice in Extremis, 36 U. CHI. L. Rnv. 455, 503(1969).
156. Hearings, at 86.
157. See note 155 supra; see also, Calif. State Bar Spec. Comm. Rep., The Ad-
ministration of Justice During Civil Disorders, 45 J.S.B.C. 191, 196 (1970).
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with the riots.1'8 The judges set higher than usual bails and only "about
two or three" were released and re-arrested for further involvement in the
riots. 159 Pre-trial preventive detention is arguably superior in these situa-
tions because it requires a showing of the need for detention by the au-
thorities and because, if properly drawn, the detention would be limited
in duration to the period of rioting or the prescribed statutory period.
Detention under high bail, with court backlogs from mass arrests, could
result in detention until the defendant pleads guilty or the long delayed
trial is held.
In contrast to the views of police officials a select committee of the
California State Bar suggested that most persons arrested in a riot be
released on their own recognizance during a civil disturbance.160 They
reasoned that (1) past experience shows nearly all defendants who are
arrested on minor offenses (the majority) will appear for trial without the
need for money security; (2) that jailing large numbers of persons is ex-
pensive and hard or impossible to achieve, and results in intolerable con-
ditions for those detained; (3) that the good public relations resulting
from reasonable police behavior in releasing arrestees will quell the dis-
turbances; (4) and that any release can be made conditional upon non-
participation in the disturbance and thereby protect community inter-
ests.161
Even the committee does not recommend release on O.R. of those who
commit major offenses.'6 2 There would then seem to be some agreement
on detaining those who are charged with the commission of serious crimes
as part of a serious civil disturbance.
A.B. 2834, if reintroduced, should be narrowed to reflect this agree-
ment by requiring for detention when (1) the charge is one of a felony
committed in furtherance of the disturbance, (2) no form of release is
satisfactory, (3) defendant is likely to contribute to the disturbance if re-
leased, and (4) any detention will be terminated at or before the end of
the disturbances. It would then be applicable only to those high risk de-
fendants and only during the emergency. The classification of arrestees
by this proposal would probably be rational and necessary and therefore
satisfy the requirements of the fourteenth amendment.
COMPARISON OF A.B. 2834 WITH OTHER PREVENTIVE
DETENTION MEASURES
Congress, in implementing pre-trial preventive detention in Washing-
ton D.C., did not mention riots but attempted to limit judicial discretion
158. Hearings, at 87.
159. Id.
160. Calif. State Bar Spec. Comm. Rep., supra note 157, at 196.
161. Id.
162. Id.
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to certain high risk categories and thereby lessen the possibilities for
abuse of judicial discretion. The Washington, D.C. act established two
general categories of defendants plus two special categories, (the special
categories are for narcotic addicts and for defendants charged with
threatening a witness or juror or otherwise obstructing the administration
of justice).1 3 The first general category is applicable to those defendants
charged with a "dangerous crime"-a robbery or attempted robbery,
common law burglary, common law arson, forcible rape or attempted
rape, or the illegal sale of drugs.'0 4 The other category is aimed at (1) all
recidivist defendants, (2) those charged with a "serious crime" (non-
white-collar felonies) who have also had a prior felony conviction within
ten years, and (3) those who are charged with committing a felony on re-
lease.'0 5 As in A.B. 2834, a substantial probability of guilt must also be
established for detaining defendants who fall within either of these two
general categories.'0 6
In a preventive detention statute proposed by the ABA, guilt is not an
element and the categories of defendants include those whose major
threat to the community is one to human life rather than property. 1 7 Six
categories are set out beginning with defendants who are charged with a
capital crime. 6  The second is defendants believed to have committed a
felony while on bail at an earlier date. 69 The third includes defendants
charged with a felony involving serious injury or attempted harm to an-
other person (similar to the D.C. category of "dangerous crimes"), and it
is found there is "a high degree of probability" that if released this defend-
ant will commit another such crime. 170  The fourth group is similar ex-
cept the offense charged need not be one involving human injury if de-
fendant has committed a prior dangerous offense within five years.1 1
The fifth category includes those defendants who threaten a material wit-
ness, those whose release would impede the administration of justice.17 2
The sixth category allows detention of those defendants it is believed
would flee the United States if released. 73 In categories three, four and
five a "high probability" of danger to some person must be shown.'1 4
What is and what is not a "high probability" should at least be outlined in
163. RFFoRm Acr OF 1970, at §§ 23-1322(a) (3), 23-1323.
164. Id. at §§ 23-1331(3), 23-1322(a)(1).
165. Id. at §§ 23-1331(4), 23-1322(a)(2).
166. Id. at §§ 23-1322(a)(1), 23-1322(a)(2).
167. ABA Project, supra note 54, at 83, 85.
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the statute. Case law and developing empirical data could eventually
make this line relatively clear cut and predictable.
Who Should be Detained
The D.C. act attempts to detain both those who are a threat to personal
safety (dangerous crimes) and those felony recidivists who threaten prop-
erty interests (serious crimes);'75 the Model Act focuses mainly on those
defendants whose release appears to threaten human safety; 176 A.B. 2834
appeared to focus on those "probably guilty' defendants a judge wanted
to detain.Y77
Crimes against property constitute the major portion of all crime and
defendants who commit property crimes are most likely to commit an-
other crime.'7 8 Criminals who commit crimes involving serious harm to
persons, such as murder, rape and aggravated assault, are known to have
a very low rate of recidivism.' 7 9 In contrast, robbers with a high rate of
recidivism and often injure their victims. 80 With the exception of rob-
bers then, the choice would appear to be to detain the defendant likely to
commit a property crime or to detain the defendant who is less likely to
commit another crime but who appears to be a threat to human safety, if
released, because of the nature of his alleged crime.
A recent empirical study conducted in Boston, using the standards pro-
vided in the Washington, D.C. measure, showed 1 out of 7 of those de-
fendants with a history of "violent crimes"' 81 were convicted of a second
crime committed while released on bail. 8 2 One out of four of those ar-
rested with a record of "dangerous crimes"'8 3 were convicted of a sec-
ond crime committed while released on bail.'8 4 These odds were reduced
to about 1 out of 3 by correlating them with other factors which could be
considered under the Washington, D.C. preventive detention law.'8 1 It
could well be argued there is not sufficient compelling state interest to
justify the detention of three defendants to prevent one from further crim-
inal acts. A fortiori, 1 out of 7 or 1 out of 4 would be less satisfactory
"odds" for detention. More accurate categories should be discovered or
detention should be made applicable only to those defendants for whom
175. See text accompanying note 163 supra.
176. See text accompanying note 174 supra.
177. See text accompanying note 130 supra.
178. PREsmNr's COMM'N, TASK FoRCE REPoRT: CRIME AND ITS IMPAcr, 79(1967).
179. Id.
180. Id. at 14-16.
181. See text accompanying note 164 supra.
182. See Comment, supra note 62, at 392.
183. See text accompanying note 169 supra.
184. See Comment, supra note 62, at 392.
185. Id.
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there is currently some authority for denying pre-trial release, those who
commit a crime punishable by death,186 those who appear likely to flee
the jurisdiction, 117 or those who in fact attempt to or do impede the ad-
ministration of justice. 88 The categories of defendants liable for pre-
trial detention might be expanded to include defendants arrested for a
serious offense committed while on release; 8 9 certain rioters; 90 and
those involved in illegal organized drug sales.' 9 ' Detaining defendants
in other categories, as defendants who commit "dangerous crimes," may
result in detention of many persons who would not commit crime while
on release.
CONCLUSION
A.B. 2834, if enacted, would have given a great amount of discretion
to the arraigning authorities. The discretion given to release defendants
on O.R., on conditions, on bail, or on some combination of these, would
have been a benefit to criminal defendants. With the emphasis on char-
acter rather than on money, and with review available within twenty-four
hours of request, poor defendants would receive the same treatment prior
to trial as rich defendants, those who can raise bail. These reforms ap-
pear to be needed and beneficial. The discretion given the same arraign-
ing authority to detain defendants as a means of preventing crime is too
broad. The required element that defendants be probably guilty is poor
justification for detention. The presumption of innocence must be re-
spected until defendants are found to be guilty "beyond a reasonable
doubt."
Even without these problems of overbreadth, and detention based on
probable guilt, it is questionable whether any form of detention would be
valid under the due process and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth
amendment. Assuming the eighth amendment is not found to bar pre-
trial detention, the ideal detention statute would be clearly applicable
only where there is a compelling need for detention and administered so
as to prejudice the detained defendants' trial as little as possible. These
two requirements of (1) a compelling state need and (2) the preservation
of the presumption of innocence, mandate a detention statute drafted to
be applicable only to those classes of defendants known to present a
threat of serious harm if released. The model ABA statute appears to be
186. CAL. PEN. CODE § 1270.
187. Mastrian v. Hedman 326 F.2d 708 (8th Cir.) cert. denied, 376 U.S. 695
(1964).
188. Fernandez v. United States, 81 S. Ct. 642, 644 (Harlan Cir. Justice, 1961);
Bitter v. United States, 389 U.S. 15, 16 (1967); Carbo v. United States 82 S. Ct. 662
(1962).
189. ABA Project, supra note 54, at 83.
190. See text accompanying note 154 supra.
191. See text accompanying note 138 supra.
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the best way of satisfying these requirements. It does not base detention
on proof of guilt but on proof to "a high degree of probability" the de-
fendant will injure another person if released, or on the likelihood de-
fendant will flee the United States, if released, or on a record of a felony
previously committed while on pre-trial release.
Although it is possible that a state can demonstrate a compelling need
to detain defendants who will be likely to injure other people if released,
the problem remains as to whether these defendants can be identified.
Our present inability to predict human behavior, may defeat the efforts to
detain "dangerous" defendants.
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